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8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10

11 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
12 Plaintiff,
13 v.
14 STEFAN W. KIRKEBY,
15 Defendant.

CASE NO. 1:22-CR-00228-JLT-SKO
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE
TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT;
ORDER
DATE: November 2, 2022
TIME: 1 p.m.
COURT: Hon. Sheila K. Oberto

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17 General Order 618 was entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19. Further,
18 pursuant to General Order 611, 612, 617, 618, 614, 620, 624, 628, and 630, and the CARES Act, this
19 Court's declaration of judicial emergency under 18 U.S.C. § 3174, and the Ninth Circuit Judicial
20 Council's Order of April 16, 2020, continuing this Court's judicial emergency, this Court has allowed
21 district judges to continue all criminal matters to a date after May 1, 2020.¹

22 Although the General Order addresses the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has
23 emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act's end-of-justice provision "counteract[s] substantive
24 openendedness with procedural strictness," "demand[ing] on-the-record findings" in a particular case.
25 *Zedner v. United States*, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). "[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no
26 exclusion under" § 3161(h)(7)(A). *Id.* at 507. And moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. *Id.*

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28 ¹ A judge "may order case-by-case exceptions" at the discretion of that judge "or upon the
request of counsel, after consultation with counsel and the Clerk of the Court to the extent such an order
will impact court staff and operations." General Order 618, ¶ 7 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020).

at 509; *see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez*, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a judge ordering and ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either orally or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which *Zedner* emphasizes as both mandatory and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, 618, 614, 620, 624, 628, and 630 and the subsequent declaration of judicial emergency require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” *Id.*

The General Orders and declaration of judicial emergency exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. *Furlow v. United States*, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. *Id.* at 767-68; *see also United States v. Correa*, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing *Furlow* to exclude time following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules.

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-of-justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4).² If continued, this Court should designate a new date

² The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make “additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge’s discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. Cal. March 18, 2020).

for the status conference. *United States v. Lewis*, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on November 2, 2022.

2. By this stipulation, defendant and government now move to continue the status conference until November 30, 2022, and to exclude time between November 2, 2022, and November 30, 2022, under Local Code T4.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a) Counsel for defendant was recently retained by defendant.

b) The government is providing initial discovery to newly retained counsel and has additional discovery to process for production.

c) Counsel for defendant needs time to review the discovery and conduct pretrial investigation.

d) Counsel for defendant is seeking to file a second motion for bail review and has discussed the same with the government.

e) The defendant agrees and stipulates that time should be excluded for the aforementioned reasons.

f) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

g) In addition to the public health concerns cited by General Order 611 and presented by the evolving COVID-19 pandemic, an ends-of-justice delay is particularly apt in this case because Counsel or other relevant individuals have been encouraged to telework and minimize personal contact to the greatest extent possible. It will be difficult to avoid personal contact should the hearing proceed.

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h) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

i) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of November 2, 2022 to November 30, 2022, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: October 25, 2022

PHILLIP A. TALBERT
United States Attorney

/s/ LAUREL J. MONTOYA
LAUREL J. MONTOYA
Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: October 25, 2022

/s/ CHRISTOPHER CANNON
CHRISTOPHER CANNON
Counsel for Defendant
STEFAN W. KIRKEBY

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 10/27/2022

Sheila K. Oberto
THE HONORABLE SHEILA K. OBERTO
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE